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Abstract
In this paper we empirically derive the welfare eects of a shift from joint taxa-
tion with full income splitting to a revenue neutral system of individual taxation in
Germany. For the empirical welfare evaluation we estimate the preference hetero-
geneity in the population and use normative welfare concepts proposed in Fleurbaey
(2006) to solve the diculties of comparison between, and aggregation of hetero-
geneous individuals and households. We show that, irrespective of the individual
welfare measure we use, individual taxation would on average increase individual
welfare. Moreover, as far as the aggregation is concerned, we show that any social
planner, ranging from a utilitarian to a Rawlsian one, would come to the same
conclusion: a policy change which replaces joint taxation with full splitting by in-
dividual taxation, would be welfare improving.
Keywords: Taxation of couples, welfare measures; labour supply; preference het-
erogeneity
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11 Introduction
For couple households, joint taxation with full income splitting (i.e. in equal parts)
as implemented in several countries such as France or Germany imposes much higher
marginal tax rates for the secondary earner - in general the wife - than individual taxation,
see e.g. Apps and Rees (1999). It is not surprising therefore, that numerous empirical
studies provide evidence of strong disincentive eects for the labor supply behavior for
secondary earners under joint taxation. This disincentive eect is not compensated by
the positive incentives for the rst earner, in general the husband, see, among others,
LaLumia (2008) for the US and Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) for Germany. This empirical
nding is the central reason why in theoretical models of optimal taxation joint taxation
of couple households is in general not the optimal tax schedule. In contrast, given the
higher elasticities of the wife, Alesina et al. (2007), and Boskin and Sheshinski (1983)
show that gender based taxation with lower marginal tax rates for the secondary earner
would be optimal, since more ecient in terms of labor supply.
There is a large body of literature on joint taxation based on either empirical models
of labor supply or on theoretical models of optimal taxation. Therefore, it is all the
more surprising how little is known about the empirical welfare eects of a policy move
from joint to individual taxation both at the individual and at the aggregate level. The
reason is that most papers limit their analysis to aggregate labour supply changes or,
when accounting for heterogeneity, present changes in labour supply and/or changes in
disposable income for deciles of the gross wage distribution.1 However, leisure being an
argument in the individual utility function, it is clear that the variable of interest at the
individual (or household) level, should be the change in welfare as measured by household
preferences. It is true that individual welfare metrics such as equivalent or compensating
variations, are wellknown and have been used widely for this purpose, see e.g. Creedy
and Kalb (2005) or Eissa et al. (2008). Since one of the major aims of this paper is to
provide empirical evidence of the impact on individual welfare of a switch to individual
taxation, we could have followed this track.
Yet, the interpretation and comparison of these classical welfare measures becomes
problematic within the framework used to model the impact of the policy shift on labour
supply behaviour with heterogenous individuals. Indeed, it has now become standard to
analyze research questions concerning changes in the tax and transfer system by means
of static structural models of labor supply. We follow this line in this paper. In particu-
lar, we derive the potential labor supply eects of replacing joint taxation by individual
taxation on the basis of estimates of a functional form of a preference representation
function. But one of the major advantages of these models, to wit the central place
alloted to heterogeneity in preferences, plays out as a major obstacle when trying to per-
form distributional, or more general, normative analyses. Indeed, normative analysis in a
1Beblo et al. (2007) look at the welfare eect of introducing individual taxation, however they
only consider within-household changes and their method does not allow for any comparison between
households or aggregation of individual welfare eects into social welfare.
2framework of heterogeneous preferences is wellknown to pose dicult - and not seldomly
neglected - problems of comparability of individual welfare. A criterion derived from a
simple aggregation of equivalent or compensating variations has been shown to be nei-
ther a sucient, nor a necessary condition to identify potential Pareto improvements, let
alone social improvements according to a well dened social welfare function (see Boad-
way and Bruce (1984), Chapter 9 or Auerbach (1985)). In this paper we therefore follow
Decoster and Haan (2010) and use welfare measures derived by Fleurbaey and co-authors
(see e.g. Fleurbaey (2006) for an overview). The distinguishing feature of the underlying
normative framework is that the welfare measures fully respect preference heterogeneity,
whereas aggregation of the classical money metrics only makes sense in a context of iden-
tical preferences or when using the socalled reference household as introduced by King
(1983).
In line with the previous studies for Germany we nd that a shift from joint taxa-
tion with full income splitting to a revenue neutral system of individual taxation would
substantially increase the labor supply of married women and increase the disposable net
household income. Moreover we can extend these ndings and show that two dierent
welfare measures which start with very dierent normative foundations suggest that in-
dividual taxation would on average increase individual welfare. Finally we show that any
social planner who expresses social welfare by means of a social preference ordering de-
ned over these individual welfare metrics, would come to the same conclusion: a policy
change which replaces joint taxation with full splitting by individual taxation, would be
welfare improving for both individual welfare metrics.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we translate the tax systems of joint
and individual taxation into the budget constraints, faced by couple households. Section
3 briey summarizes the microdata and the microsimulation model used to estimate the
labour supply model. The estimated model is presented in section 4, together with the
simulated labour supply eects of the switch from joint to individual taxation. Section
5 discusses the individual welfare eects of this reform, and also answers the question
whether social welfare, dened as some weighted aggregate of indvidual welfare, is higher
under individual than under joint taxation. Section 6 concludes.
2 Joint taxation with full splitting versus individual
taxation of couples
In this section we compare joint taxation with full splitting and individual taxation in
terms of the stylized household budget constraint and the working incentives for both
spouses. We also provide a brief overview of the current system of joint taxation with full
income splitting in Germany and describe the eects of a hypothetical reform of replacing
joint taxation with individual taxation.
32.1 Budget constraint
We use a stylized and simplied setting to discuss the eect of joint and individual taxation
on the budget constraint of a household. We assume that labor earnings are the only
source of income and that households do neither save nor borrow. Furthermore we abstract
from any governmental transfers and social security contributions.
When married couples are taxed jointly with full income splitting, the budget con-
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the hours of work of each spouse. T(:) denotes the progressive income tax schedule. It is
applied on half the joint taxable income, and the resulting tax liability is then multiplied
again by a factor 2.





















The household net income is now determined by gross labor income of the two spouses
minus the sum of the individual tax payments, which are themselves determined indepen-
dently from each other. In terms of disposable income, a household can only gain from
joint taxation with full income splitting when the tax schedule is progressive.2 This gain,
the splitting advantage, depends on the inequality between the parters's earnings and the
level of overall household taxable income. But maybe more importantly, under individual
taxation marginal tax rates of one spouse only depend on this spouses' individual labor
income. In contrast, under joint taxation the labor income of the partner matters for the
marginal tax rate of the other spouse. In a setting, where we dene the rst earner to
be the partner with the higher labor income and the secondary earner the one with lower
labor income, the rst earner will always benet from joint taxation, while the secondary
earner faces higher marginal tax rates under joint taxation. Also these eects increase
with the dierence between the partner's income.
2.2 Income taxation of couples in Germany
In theory, the German income tax is based on the principle of comprehensive income
taxation. That is, the sum of a household's income from all sources is taxed at a single
rate after several deductions have been applied. The tax schedule is piecewise linear and
progressive. Married couples are taxed jointly. As described above, the income tax of
a married couple is calculated by applying the tax function to half of the sum of the
spouses' incomes; this amount is then doubled to determine the tax amount of the couple.
2Not surprisingly, therefore, one measure of progressivity of a tax schedule is based on the gain from
splitting, see Lambert (2001)
4Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) provide a detailed discussion and analysis of the German
system of joint taxation with full splitting. For dierent household types they calculate
the splitting advantage, that is the tax reduction of joint taxation with full splitting
relative to individual taxation.
The introduction of individual taxation without changing the tax schedule would sig-
nicantly increase government's tax revenues, since it would absorbe the splitting advan-
tages of the current system. At the same time, disposable net income of households would
decrease. Each household would suer a loss equal to the splitting advantage it enjoys
under the current system of joint taxation. In the following section we will empirically
identify those households who benet most of the system of joint taxation, by analyz-
ing the eect of the transition to individual taxation for household types that vary by
demographic characteristics.
3 Data, microsimulation and descriptive evidence
Our empirical analysis is based on the German Socio Economic Panel Study (SOEP)
which is a representative household survey for Germany with detailed information about
the socio-economic situation of households (Wagner et al. 2007). Moreover the data
includes information about the employment behavior of all household members. For this
analysis we make use of data collected in 2005 which yields the information for the tax
year 2004. We restrict the sample to married households with a wife aged between 20 and
60, who is not self-employed, retired or in full-time education. Finally, we include only
households with full-time working men. This gives us a sample of 2076 households. This
sample restriction is motivated by the behavioural analysis in which we only focus on the
labor supply of women and assume that the behavior of the husband is xed. In fact we
assume that the female partner of the household optimally decides about her labor supply
behavior and maximizes household utility conditional on her partner's behavior.3
The SOEP is used as the input dataset for the Microsimulation model STSM (Steiner
et al. 2008) which describes in detail the German tax and transfer system. Given ob-
served gross earnings of households it is possible to determine the tax liabilities of the
current tax system with joint taxation and the resulting net household income for all ob-
served households. Moreover it is possible to derive the tax payments and the net income
assuming hypothetical scenarios of taxation, e.g. individual taxation.
Table 1 presents disposable net household income for dierent subgroups under joint
and individual taxation and the resulting income dierences between the two systems. In
this descriptive table we do not consider any behavioural reaction of the households. As
mentioned above introducing individual taxation would substantially increase tax revenues
of the government and hence the potential supply of public goods. Since we wanted to
keep public good consumption outside the individual welfare analysis, a more sensible
3At rst glance, this often applied simplication might seem restrictive. However, empirical evidence
suggests that cross elasticities between household partners are either not signicant or of little importance
(Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004), which justies this assumption.
5Table 1: Changes in net income: Joint versus Individual taxation
Income in Euro Income in Euro Change
Joint taxation Individual taxation in income
Quintiles of gross earnings of the husband
I 2356 2479 123
II 2731 2796 65
III 3014 3039 25
IV 3497 3477 -20
V 4928 4734 -194
Quintiles of inequality of earnings between spouses
I 3495 3680 185
II 3440 3593 153
III 3516 3542 25
IV 3533 3299 -234
V 2538 2408 -130
West versus East Germany
West Germany 3389 3361 -28
East Germany 2967 3080 113
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and STSM. All
income information is per month. Inequality of earnings be-
tween spouses is calculated as the share of the husband's
earning in total household earnings.
comparison of the two tax systems is obtained by imposing revenue neutrality. We do
this by redistributing the additional tax revenue from individual taxation as a lump sum
benet on a household basis to all married households.
We compare the income dierences by the level of earnings of the full time working
husband, by the inequality of earnings between the two spouses, and by region. The
inequality of earnings between the two spouses is dened as the ratio of the husband's
earnings over total household earnings. Hence, a ratio of 1 implies maximal inequality
within the household.
The distributional analysis in Table 1 reveals that a revenue neutral form of introduc-
ing individual taxation aects dierent household types dierently. Consistent with the
splitting gain to be increasing with earnings, we nd that households with lower earn-
ings of the husband would benet from the transition to individual taxation, whereas
particularly those in the highest quintile would lose in terms of disposable income. Also
according to expectations, the second panel in the table shows a loss for households with
high earnings inequality between the spouses, and a gain for households with the least
unequal intra family distribution of earnings. The latter households did not benet from
6the splitting advantage under joint taxation and now benet from the lump sum transfer.
The households with more unequal earnings between spouses, on the other hand, loose
a splitting advantage which exceeded the lump sum transfer they now receive. As well
documented in the literature (Steiner and Wrohlich, 2004), household in West Germany
would lose from the introduction of individual taxation whereas those in the east would
benet. This is explained both by lower household incomes of east Germans and higher
equality of earnings. For the other demographic groups dierences are smaller.
4 The labor supply model
We estimate the labor supply eects of introducing individual taxation by means of a
static structural discrete choice model of labor supply, similar to Aaberge et al. (1995)
or van Soest (1995). The model is structural, because it starts from a specication of a
utility function of the household which depends on household consumption and female
leisure time. Since we assume that the labor supply of the husband is xed, his leisure
time does not aect utility. The model is a discrete choice model because it reduces the
choices of the individual (in this case the number of hours worked) to a nite number of
discrete alternatives. The main advantage of this discrete specication over the continuous
framework is the possibility to account for the non-linearities in the budget set and to
cope with the endogeneity of net-household income in a relative straightforward way.
4.1 Description of female participation and hours of work in a
discrete setting
In the discrete choice model the utility level of household i at a nite number of discrete
chosen levels of labour supply is specied. We index the discrete points by means of
the subscript j = 1;:::;J. For female labour supply, we dene J = 5 discrete working
alternatives: non-participation, two part time alternatives, full-time work and over-time.4
Table 2 shows the overall distribution of the households at the ve alternatives. We
also show average working hours and average monthly net household income and the
shares by region, by education level and by the presence of children younger than 3 years
old. The data reveal the relatively low labour market attachment of married women.
About 29% of all married women are not working, close to 50% works part time and less
than a quarter of all married women work regular hours or more. Since in our sample,
husbands work at least 30 hours, the distribution of household income between the 5
discrete states is not very unequal. In addition, this is partly related to the joint taxation
with full splitting which leads to high marginal tax rates for the secondary earner.
Table 2 shows interesting dierences in the distribution across the employment states
by region, education, and family composition. In our sample roughly 20 % of all house-
holds live in East Germany, but we only nd 13% East Germans amongst the non-working
4The median of the empirical distribution in the following intervals dene the discrete points: 0, [0 -
15], [16 - 34], [35 - 40], > 40. The estimation results are robust to changes in the approximation of the
distribution of working hours.
7Table 2: Discrete employment states
Working Net East Child
Employment Share Hours Income Germans Education younger than
in % per week per months in % in years 3 years
1 not working 29.06 0 2744 13.07 11.68 27.28
2 0 - 15 hrs 18.00 10 3107 6.33 11.49 10.29
3 16 - 34 hrs 29.01 23 3398 18.99 11.91 4.09
4 35 - 40 hrs 18.33 38 3805 38.60 12.34 2.59
5 >40 hrs 5.60 42 3943 48.31 13.35 3.38
Notes: The sample consists of 2076 married households where the husband is working at least 30 hours.
The second column gives median working hours for the intervals 0, [0 - 15], [16 - 34], [35 - 40], > 40, and
this median is used to dene the discrete employment states.
The share of East German households in the population is 20%, 11% of all women are low educated,
i.e. 9 years of school or less, and 11.5% of all households have a child younger 3 years.
Source: SOEP, wave 2005 and STSM
women, and even less among part time work. On the other hand the share of East Ger-
mans in the subset of households where the wife is working fulltime is close to 40%. For
over time work the overrepresentation of East-Germans is even larger. By education we
nd that women who work more hours tend to have more years of education. The opposite
holds for family composition. Close to 30% of non-working women have a child younger
than three years, as opposed to only 3% of those working full time or more hours.
To derive net household income according to the tax legislation in Germany in 2004 at
each discrete alternative of working hours, we use the microsimulation model STSM, men-
tioned above. More precisely, for each discrete hours point we calculate gross household
earnings as the sum of observed earnings of the husband and the state specic earnings of
the wife. Gross earnings of the women are simply the state specic hours multiplied by
her expected market wage. For working women we take the observed wage information
as their market wage, while for the non-working we impute their expected market wage
using an estimated wage equation with selection correction.5 The information on gross
earnings is the key input for the microsimulation model which describes, in detail, all rel-
evant transfer programmes, social security contributions and income taxation and which
delivers the state specic net-household income.
4.2 The Box-Cox utility function
The state specic level of utility of household i, denoted vij, at the j = 1;:::;J, discrete
states, described in the previous subsection, consists of a deterministic and a stochastic
part:
vij = u(cij;(1   lij);zi) + ij; (3)
where cij denotes the state specic net-household income cij at choice j and lij is the
labor supply of the wife in household i at choice j. Leisure time at each hours point is the
5Estimation results for the wage equation can be obtained from the authors upon request.
8time endowment T = 80 minus working time. In (3) we normalize the time endowment
at 1, such that the wife's leisure time is simply (1   lij).
The deterministic part of the utility function is represented by u(cij;(1 lij);zi); and
ij is a stochastic random error term which varies independently between the individuals
and the discrete points. Preference heterogeneity is captured by vector zi. Note that we
will limit the analysis to observed preference heterogeneity (see below) and hence neglect
household specic heterogeneity which is unobserved. We assume that all unobservable
eects are captured by the stochastic term ij.
Similar to Aaberge et al. (2004) we use a Box-Cox functional form to specify the
deterministic part of the utility function in (3):






(1   lij)L   1
L
; (4)
where preference heterogeneity is introduced by means of taste-shifters in the following
form:
L(zi) = L0 + 
0
L1zi; (5)
and vector zi includes the age of both spouses, educational dummies, the number and age
of children and a regional dummy. Preferences are determined by the parameters c, L0,
0
L1, c and L. The -parameters determine the marginal utility of consumption and
leisure, whereas the -parameters determine the concavity of the utility function.
The estimation procedure is based on the assumption that the error terms ij are i.i.d.
and follow an extreme value distribution. This gives an expression of the probability
for each discrete working alternative, which results in the well known conditional logit
framework that can be estimated by maximum likelihood. As already announced above,
we do not account for unobserved heterogeneity. Haan (2006) has shown that unobserved
heterogeneity does not signicantly aect the labour supply elasticities when using a
similar specication with cross sectional data. Nor do we model potential restrictions on
the labour market as in Aaberge et al. (2004) or Bargain et al. (2010). The ndings
of Bargain et al. (2010) imply that demand side constraints bias elasticities in particular
for men and single women, but tend to be less severe for the labour supply decision of
married women.
4.3 Estimated preferences for income and leisure
Table 3 presents the estimated parameters of the Box-Cox utility function in (4). Param-
eters c and L, both smaller than 1, indicate that the utility function is concave with
respect to consumption and leisure time. For consumption, the curvature comes close to a
logarithmic functional form (which would be the case if c = 0) and the concavity is more
pronounced for leisure. As expected, households value consumption positively (c = 3:47
being positive) and - on average - women also value leisure time positively (L0 = 0:64).
9However, we nd signicant preference heterogeneity by observable characteristics.6 In
line with previous studies we nd that the taste for leisure increases with the presence
of children, in particular for children younger than 3 years. We nd positive eects of
the educational dummies, where the reference category is high education. This implies
that ceteris paribus women with low and medium education have a higher preference for
leisure than women with the highest educational degree. Finally, we nd important dif-
ferences between women in East and West Germany. In line with the descriptive statistics
of table 2, women in West Germany have a signicantly lower inclination to work. This
dierent pattern in female employment behaviour has often been analysed and is mainly
explained by the dierent history and socialisation of the two parts of Germany before the
reunication. We already noted that this preference heterogeneity poses dicult - and
not seldomly neglected - problems of comparability of individual welfare for the welfare
analysis of this tax reform. We take this up in following section.








L1 (taste shifter dummies)
Age of wife 1.79 0.95
Age of husband -1.02 0.86
Child younger 3 1.75 0.41
Child between 4 and 6 0.95 0.23
East Germany -0.64 0.15
Low Education 0.40 0.15
Medium Education 0.28 0.10
L -1.82 0.33
Notes: c and L determine the concavity of the utility function
with respect to consumption and leisure. c and L determine the
marginal utility of consumption and leisure.
Source: SOEP; Number of observations: 2076
5 Eects of the tax reform
5.1 Labor supply eects
Based on the estimated structural model we simulate the labor supply responses of women
when replacing joint with individual taxation. As mentioned above, we simulate this tax
6See Decoster and Haan (2010) for a more detailed discussion of the preference heterogeneity using
this empirical specication
10reform under the constraint of revenue neutrality by redistributing the additional revenue
under individual taxation as a lump sum benet to all married households. More precisely,
to calculate the labor supply responses, we integrate over the stochastic error terms and
calculate the expected choice of women before and after the tax reform. We do this twice,
once for joint taxation with full splitting, and then for individual taxation including the
lump sum transfer. The dierence in the female participation rate and the expected
working hours between these two scenarios give an indication of the labor supply eects
of the reform.
Table 4 summarizes the results, which, broadly spoken, are in line with the earlier
study of Steiner and Wrohlich (2004). The participation rate (extensive margin) of the
subpopulation of females living in couples increases across the board with 5.88%. Total
labour supply (extensive and intensive margin combined) even goes up by 10.71%. The
variation of this substantial positive labour supply eect across the dierent subgroups
in table 4 can be explained by the dierences in preferences (table 3) and in the working
incentives, i.e. changes in the disposable net household income due to the tax reform
(table 1). Labor supply eects both in terms of participation and working hours increase
monotonically with the gross earnings of the spouse. Similarly the eects tend to increase
with the inequality of earnings between the two spouses. These patterns are very much
in line with the incentives eects shown in table 1.
By demographic characteristics the most striking dierence is for women in East and
West Germany. Whereas west German wives increase their labour supply by 6.79% and
the working hours by 12.16%, married women in the eastern part react with 2.32% (par-
ticipation) and 5.08% substantively less. This is indeed in line with the dierent changes
in the disposable net household income discussed above. In addition preferences are im-
portant to explain this dierence. As mentioned above, women in West Germany have
a signicantly lower inclination to work, leading to lower participation rates and lower
working hours. This implies ceteris paribus they can change their behavior more than the
East German women who to a large extent work already before the reform.
5.2 Welfare eects of the tax reform: gainers and losers
In this section of the paper we go beyond the previous literature on the eects of replacing
joint taxation with individual taxation in Germany. In fact this literature limited itself
to describing the results as in the previous subsection, that is: in terms of eects on
labour supply. Yet, for the evaluation of this kind of reform, which triggers a considerable
eect on labour supply, one needs a more comprehensive individual welfare measure than
simply net household income. Decreased leisure being the counterpart of the increase in
participation or working hours, one has to account for this in a genuine welfare analysis
of the reform.
In classical applied welfare analysis, individual welfare metrics such as equivalent or
compensating variations have been used intensively. But as already noted in the introduc-
tion, in a context of individuals with heterogeneous preferences, both the interpretation
11Table 4: Labor supply eects
Change in Change in
participation (in %) working hours (in %)
All households 5.88 10.71













West Germany 6.79 12.16
East Germany 2.32 5.06
Without children younger 3 5.47 10.36
With children younger 3 8.97 13.37
Low education 5.91 10.55
Medium or high education 5.61 11.99
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and STSM. All income
information is per month. Inequality of earnings of spouses is calcu-
lated as the share of the husband's earning over the total household
earnings.
12of these welfare metrics, and certainly their aggregation quickly faces serious dicul-
ties. Therefore, in this paper we pursue a dierent empirical strategy which is based on
normative welfare concepts proposed in Fleurbaey (2006). In particular we empirically
calculate the 'Rent' criterion and the 'Wage' criterion. Under the 'Wage' criterion, we
judge two individuals as equally well o when they have the same hypothetical net wage
rate, irrespective of the choices they make. In terms of a responsibility-compensation cut,
a social planner using this criterion would hold people fully responsible for dierences in
their tastes for leisure, but would be prepared to compensate people for dierences in their
productivities. Thus, dierences in preferences, leading to dierent choices, are considered
not to be a sucient reason for redistributing, or for ranking people as worse or better o.
When using the 'Rente' criterion, on the other hand, one oers maximal protection for
people who have a larger distaste for working. From this perspective, choosing the Rente
criterion as the welfare metric implements an underlying normative choice of holding peo-
ple with a strong aversion to work minimally responsible for these preferences. We refer
to Decoster and Haan (2010) for a more extensive discussion of these - and other, related
- metrics and for the empirical strategy to calculate these dierent welfare measures in a
structural discrete choice setting. Anyhow, the measures are directly related to the above
estimated preferences, since - contrary to the concept of equivalent income as dened in
King (1983) - they retain the full preference heterogeneity of the sample in the normative
step of the analysis.
Table 5 displays the average value of the change in the three individual welfare metrics:
net income, 'Rent' criterion and 'Wage' criterion, for the whole subpopulation, and for
dierent subgroups. All measures can be interpreted in monetary terms. Of course, their
dierent denition makes a direct comparison dicult: the 'Rent' criterion is calculated
as monthly net income assuming that the wife is not working and the 'Wage' criterion as
monthly gross earnings of the wife assuming full time work.
Starting with the eect on net disposable income, the dierence with the numbers in
table 1 is entirely due to the labour supply eect. Although we did impose revenue neu-
trality for the government, on average net disposable income of the households increased
by 105 Euro per month. This is of course due to the increased economic activity. Com-
pared to table 1, all subgroups gain more or lose less, and the ranking of gainers and losers
in terms of characteristics is not really aected by the changes in labour supply. Some
groups, like West German households, households with children younger than three, or
the fourth quintile of both the distributions in the upper two panels of the table, succeed
in turning their income loss with unchanged behaviour, into an income gain by working
more.
However, the two rightmost columns of table 5 show that it is important to take leisure
into account when assessing individual welfare. Take the West German households for
example. They do gain in terms of net income by working more. But once the lost leisure
time is also valued in the welfare measure (and this on the basis of the individual's own
preferences), West German households do lose by the transition to individual taxation.
The same reversal from gainers to loser holds for the fourth quintile of the distribution
13Table 5: Change in individual welfare measures according to dierent metrics
Change in Change in Change in
net household income Rent criterion Wage criterion
All households 104.54 24.92 7.89
Quintiles of gross earnings of the husband
I 180.05 138.08 77.83
II 156.03 85.58 47.20
III 132.24 51.17 27.11
IV 102.92 11.16 -0.56
V -49.53 -162.79 -113.00
Quintiles of inequality of earnings between spouses
I 201.17 150.57 86.95
II 188.11 107.39 60.78
III 141.23 50.30 25.48
IV 67.92 -24.47 -24.78
V -76.38 -159.94 -109.48
Demographic characteristics
West Germany 85.68 -4.73 -6.21
East Germany 178.01 140.38 62.79
Without children younger 3 116.40 35.84 16.59
With children younger 3 13.93 -58.55 -58.69
Low education 107.42 27.78 8.82
Medium or high education 81.47 1.95 0.41
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and STSM. All income information
is per month. Inequality of earnings of spouses is calculated as the share of
the husband's earning over the total household earnings. The 'Rent' criterion
is calculated as monthly net income assuming that the wife is not working and
the 'Wage' criterion as monthly gross earnings of the wife assuming full time
work.
14according to earnings inequality between the spouses. Since all groups work more, the
welfare gain is clearly smaller than the income gain for all groups. Note also that the
picture is quite robust with respect to the choice between the two broader welfare metrics.7
The second, and from a policy perspective maybe even more important conclusion from
table 5 is that, even when taking into account lost leisure time, the overall average welfare
gain of a transition to a revenue neutral individual taxation, is still positive. Moreover
this nding is independent of the very dierent normative underpinings of the two welfare
measures. As mentioned above under the 'Wage' criterion agents are fully responsible for
a larger distaste for working whereas in the 'Rent' criterion one oers maximal protection
for these agents. Thus in very dierent normative settings, introducing revenue neutral
individual taxation instead of joint taxation increases the overall average welfare.
Of course, since there exists a large variation in the welfare eects across the dierent
households, the next question which pops up is whether the distributional pattern of gains
and losses would be approved by an inequality averse social planner or if the results hold
only for the population average. This is the topic of the next and last subsection.
5.3 Eects on social welfare
To answer the question about the distributional eects, one approach could be to calculate
some inequality measure like the Gini coecient, or the Atkinson or the Theil measure for
varying degrees of inequality aversion of the social planner. But we can present a stronger
result. In table 6 we show the Lorenz ordinates of the ten deciles of the distribution of
welfare, as measured by the three dierent metrics. We do nd Lorenz dominance for all
three possible choices of the welfare measure: net income, the 'Rent' criterion or the 'Wage'
criterion. That means that any scale invariant inequality measure which embodies the
transfer- or Pigou-Dalton principle would rank the welfare distribution under individual
taxation as less unequal than the one under joint taxation. This implies, inequality in
welfare denitely decreases by this reform, independently from the individual welfare
measure used, and independently from how concerned one is about inequality.
Combined with the nding from table 5 that average welfare also increases due to the
reform, the Lorenz dominance of table 6 translates into what is known as Generalized
Lorenz Dominance. The ordinates of the Generalized Lorenz curve are the ordinates of
the Lorenzcurve multiplied with the average of the distribution, see Shorrocks (1983) or
Lambert (2001) for details. Switching from the analysis of the Lorenzcurve to one based
on the generalized Lorenz curve amounts to changing the perspective from inequality to
social welfare, where the latter not only takes into account the distribution of the pie,
but also the size of the pie. Therefore our generalized Lorenz dominance result is even
stronger.
It says that any social planner who expresses social welfare by means of a social pref-
erence ordering which embodies only two mild properties, Paretianity (more is better
than less) and the transfer principle (or inequality aversion), would come to the same
7This is in contrast with the results we presented in Decoster and Haan (2010) as far as the welfare
ordering in terms of levels are concerned.
15Table 6: Lorenz ordinates for the distribution of welfare under joint and individ-
ual taxation
Net household income Rent criterion Wage criterion
Joint tax Individual tax Joint tax Individual tax Joint tax Individual tax
1 6.14 6.44 5.99 6.35 4.88 5.25
2 13.31 13.79 13.06 13.61 11.25 11.95
3 21.15 21.77 20.79 21.52 18.69 19.63
4 29.48 30.25 29.06 29.93 26.82 27.96
5 38.41 39.29 37.90 38.89 35.64 36.91
6 47.84 48.84 47.25 48.37 45.14 46.47
7 58.06 59.10 57.38 58.54 55.62 56.95
8 69.29 70.28 68.61 69.73 67.32 68.53
9 82.27 82.98 81.75 82.53 80.99 81.84
10 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP and STSM. All income information
is per month.
conclusion: a policy change which replaces joint taxation with full splitting by individual
taxation, would be welfare improving. Whether one adheres to a utilitarian social welfare
function (which is inequality neutral), to a Rawlsian one (which is extremely inequality
averse, and only concerned about the change in welfare at the very bottom of the distri-
bution) or anything in between, one always orders the two social states in the same way:
individual taxation is better than joint taxation. Note that this conclusion holds for both
the 'Rent' criterion and the 'Wage' criterion.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide empirical evidence that a shift from joint taxation with full
income splitting to a revenue neutral system of individual taxation in Germany would
i) substantially increase the labor supply of married women, ii) increase the disposable
net household income, iii) increase the individual welfare and iv) increase social welfare,
dened as a function of the individual welfare levels. Our ndings in terms of labor
supply support previous results for Germany, e.g. Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) which have
studied a replacement of joint taxation using the same empirical method which takes into
account labour supply eects by means of a discrete choice model. We go beyond this
literature and, in addition to labour supply and income eects, we calculate the welfare
eects induced by this tax reform. The welfare eects are in particular informative for
the political debate because they account for the change in leisure time induced by a tax
reform.
For empirical welfare evaluations individual welfare metrics such as equivalent or com-
pensating variations, have often been used and it is well known that in a context of indi-
viduals with heterogeneous preferences, both the interpretation of these welfare metrics,
16and certainly their aggregation quickly faces serious diculties. In this paper we solve
these diculties and pursue a dierent empirical strategy which is based on normative
welfare concepts proposed in Fleurbaey (2006). The advantage of theses welfare mea-
sures is that they try to unveil more explicitly the normative assumptions on which the
interpersonal comparability rests.
In particular we empirically calculate the 'Rent' criterion and the 'Wage' criterion
which express dierent assumptions of comparability of welfare levels and how to treat
them in redistributive policies. The 'Rent' criterion assumes maximal protection for peo-
ple who have a larger distaste for working, whereas for the 'Wage' criterion it is assumed
that people are fully responsible for dierences in their tastes for leisure. Despite these
dierent assumptions the two welfare measure give the same results. This allows us to
draw a robust conclusion concerning the welfare eects of introducing individual taxation.
Overall we nd that individual welfare increases when replacing joint taxation with income
splitting by a revenue neutral version of individual taxation. Certainly some households
are losers, namely those households who benet the most from joint taxation, but this
eect is outnumbered by the gainers of this reform. The policy conclusion with respect
to this tax reform becomes even stronger when focussing on the eects of social welfare.
Our results show that irrespective of the welfare criterion and even more importantly of
the redistributive tastes of the social planner, a reform towards individual taxation would
increase social welfare.
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